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PREFACE
This study was prepared by the Low Cost Silicon Solar Array
Project staff on two somewhat disjoint subjects: the diffusion of new
industrial production technologies and the determinants of success of
previous federally funded demonstration projects. The research was
limited to secondary sources. In essence, a literature search on these
two subjects was the primary aim of the study.
That search led, however, to some fairly strong conclusions out
of which specific recommendations for the future plans and conduct of
the LSSA Project have been derived. It must be emphasized that these
recommendations are made only on the basis of the evidence coisidered.
That is, no attempt has been made here to incorporate the myriad other
factors which bear significantly on the Project (e.g., funding levels
or political imperatives). Thus, these recommendations are not intended
as a comprehensive set of project management recommendations to the
Photovoltaic Program or the Department of Energy. They are to be viewed
k .J	 as an input into such a comprehensive set.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document summarizes the results of a study which analyzes
i
the Low Cost Silicon Solar Array Project (LSSA) plans with respect to
the industrialization (as opposed to commercialization ) of new produc-
tion technologies expected to be forthcoming as a resu.t of the pro-
f	 ject's technology development efforts. In particular, LSSA's mandate to
I
Finsure an annual production capability of 500 MW peak for the photo-
voltaic supply industry by 1986 is critically examined. The examination
focuses on one of the concerns behind this goal--timely development of
industrial capacity to supply anticipated demand. Conclusions from the
analysis are utilized in a discussion of LSSA's industrialization
plans, particularly the plans for pilot, demonstration, and commercial
scale production plants. Specific recommendations for the implementa-
':ion of an industrialization task and the disposition of Lhe project
quantity goal are derived.1
For the purposes of the National Photovoltaic Program (and this
document), industrialization has been explicitly defined as the process
by which new technology is adopted by the photovoltaic supply industry.
Commercialization, on the other hand, refers to the process by which
an effective demand for photovoltaics is realized, given product
price. Thus, commercialization deals with user acceptance and indus-
trialization with supplier acceptance. This document is concerned only
with supply-side issues, in accordance with the LSSA Project plan.2
Problems associated with the demand for photovoltaics are not
considered. In particular it is assumed that "adequate" demand for
photovoltaic arrays exists. This demand may arise from purely private
sources, or from some combination of private, governmental, and
government-subsidized purchases. With this assumption, it is possible
to discover if purely supply-side constraints may give rise to barriers
that impede the successful introduction or diffusion of photovoltaics.
F
E
1See the Preface for a discussion of the intent behind these
recommendations.
i
2 SOV CommWrcializatIon and IndURtrializat1on of Photovo I taics: Draft
Pkin, I'hOtovoltrtic Prcgr,w , 11.inning Group, July 1177.
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The activities of the Photovoltaic Conversion Program of DOE's
Division of Solar Technology are planned "to develop and to promote
the use of photovoltaic systems to such an extent that the private
sector will produce and utilize cost-competitive photovoltaic systems"1
(italics added). This broad statement of purpose has been translated
into specific objectives for both the Photovoltaic Program and the LSSA
Project. In particular, the specific JPI. project goal for 1985-86 is
"to reduce today's (1975) solar array prices of $20,000 to $25,000 per
kilowatt (peak) in annual quantities of 100 kilowatts to less than
$500 per kilowatt (peak) in annual quantities of 500,000 kilowatts."1
Given the emphasis on cost-competitiveness and private sector
involvement and production with which the program began, the
importance attached to price reduction seems entirely appropriate.
LSSA's resources are primarily devoted to reducing the cost of photo-
voltaic arrays. It is clear that photovoltaics will never make a
significant contribution to the nation's energy supply unless and
until it becomes competitive in the price dimension with other sources
of electricity.
From the beginning, however, both the program and project have
been concerned that a demonstration of the technical ability to produce
solar arrays at a "cost-effective" price will not be sufficient to
bring about their speedy introduction, acceptance, and diffusion into
the energy production sector. Thus, the cost reduction goal has been
supplemented with other goals specifically aimed at promoting user and
supplier acceptance.2
"The objectives of the ERDA [DOE] Program are
...to stimulate the creation of a viable industrial and
commercial capability to produce and distribute these
systems for widespread use in commercial, residential, and
governmental applications."
I First Annual Report, LSSA Project, F.RDA/JPL-1012-76/5, p. 1-1.
` Ibid, p. 1-1.
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"JPL's role in the GRDA plan:
...to encourage expansion of industrial capability to
produce solar arrays. To support methods of user
acceptance."
Thus, the 500 MW peak/year capacity goal of the LSSA project is at
least partially the result of such concerns over supply-side acceptance
of new production technology and the speed with which new production
technology can be brought on line.
There are, however, at least two possible interpretations of, or
motivations for, the 500 MW peak/year output goal in addition to the pro-
motion of supplier acceptance. First, attainment of the capacity goal
has come to be viewed as an aid in the successful realization of the
project price goal. That is, because of the factors lying behind the
so-called "learning curve," assuring a large annual output will in and
of itself promote the attainment of a smaller per unit cost.
Fiore fundamentally, the 500 MW peak/year goal can be interpreted
as an ultimate standard against which the entire photovoltaic program
may be judged. Since 500 M is approximately 1 percent of the total
annual additions to the electrical generation capacity in the United
States, this may be viewed as the threshold level above which the
photovoltaic program will be considered a success. The implications
for the LSSA project of either alternative interpretation of the
output goal are elaborated below.
Thus, this document analyzes the industrialization goal of the
LSSA project. The conclusions of that analysis are used to develop
recommendations with respect to pilot, demonstration, and commercial
scale production plants, as well as the disposition of the current LSSA
annual output goal.
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Following from this evidence, four major recommendations for the
LSSA project are set forth in the final chapter:
(1) Construction of small scale pilot plants is recommended if
and when it is believed they would contribute significantly
to technology development.
(2) Large-scale demonstrations of photovoltaic production
technology should only be undertaken when, from the oper-
ating experience gained in pilot facilities, it is deter-
mined that the technology is "well in hand." (See below
for an elaboration of the definition, purpose, and
characteristics of well-planned federal demonstrations.)
(3) Commercial scale production of photovoltaic arrays should
be left to the private sector. (However, significant
quantities of arrays will likely be forthcoming from the
demonstration in (2) above. Furthermore, an adequate
demonstration may be physically identical to expected
future commercial plants.)
(4) The 500 MW peak annual output goal should be shifted to
Program Headquarters if it is meant as a passive standard
against which to judge the success of the entire photo-
voltaic program (1 percent of the annual net additions to
electrical generation capacity in the U.S.). *
 Other
interpretations of the intent of this output goal lead to
the conclusion that no specific production capacity should
Of course, ISSA is currently a major portion of the Photovoltaics
Program and as such remains committed to Program goals, including any
production capacity goals (e.g., 500 MW). The close contact between
JPL and the photovoltaic array industry gives JPL a unique advantage
for the accomplishment of certain tasks necessary to implement a
capacity goal. In particular, the monitoring of current industry
production techniques and quantities, industry views of future govern-
ment and private markets, and industry willingness to invest in new
technologies can probably best be accomplished within the LSSA Project.
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6be predetermined. Rather, this quantity should be set as
the needs for demonstrations, tests, etc., surface.
These recommendations stem from a whole set of conclusions
reached during; the course of the Study. 'file most important of these
conclusions are:
(1) No significant supply-side harriers to the adoption and
diffusion of new technology are anticipated other than
those arising from government interference or the under-
standable reluctance of businessmen to invest in highl.\
capital-intensive production processes in a regime of
rapidly changing technology. In particular, neither
information flow problems, industry structure nor capital
availability are anticipated to be significant problems
^
I
	with respect to the adoption of new photovoltaic produc-
tion technology. Thus, "technology transfer" is not felt
to be a major problem. Nevertheless, given its importance,
technology transfer must continually be addressed to insure
the successful completion of Program and Project goals.
Furthermore, the reluctance of businessmen to invest in
highly capital-intensive production processes when
1	 technology is changing rapidly is socially desirable and
t
should not be viewed as a barrier to be overcome.
(2) The length of time necessary to build a photovoltaic
production facility is relatively short, wi t h estimates
ranging from 6 months to 2-1/2 years. I!. is generally
agreed that as long as sufficient floor space is available,
the actual assembly of a production line could take place
In less than a year (construction of buildings would add
12-18 months to the necessary time). Historical evidence
from the semiconductor industry as well as estimates -rom
Theodore Barry and Associates (under contract to .111.)
were used to stippo rt this conclusion.	 r
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(3) The most significant problems impeding the widespread
adoption of photovoltaic systems arise from a high product
price and the subsequent lack cif demand for the product.
Thus, the emphasis of the LSSA project on price reduction
seems totally justified. If ani when the price is reduced
to a point where photovoltaics is cost-competitive with
alternative energy sources, the photovoltaic supply industry
will quickly respond to and meet all demands.	 ll
1.
(4) Any subsidy to photovoltaics (justified on the basis that
solar energy systems avoid some negative externalities
Involved in conventional sources) should be applied to the
stimulation of product demand. That is, the purchase,
riot the production, of photovoltaics should be subsidized.
This conclusion was reached on the basis that demand-side
subsidies tend to enhance competition among suppliers,
whereas either supply-side subsidies or government
production are likely to significantly lessen the com-
petitiveness of the industry.
(5) Pilot plants should have as their primary purpose the res-
olution of technological problems. To facilitate this
they .should be as small as feasible, have a flexible design,
and maintain a low political profile. It should be expected
that there will be frequent shutdowns and modifications of
facilities. Experimentation and innovation are encouraged
in pilot plant facilities.
(6) Demonstrations, on the othe r hand, should be used to produce
information (reduce uncertainty) in dimensions other than
technology development. These include uncertainties with
respect to (a) product cost, (b) product demand,
(c) institutional barriers or impediments, and (d) exter-
nalities (e.g., pollution). A demonstration should not be
undertaken until the technology is well in hand--that is,
until the technology is tested, understood, and stable.
7
Note, however, that demonstrations are intended primarily
for the production, not the dissemination, of information.
As mentioned above, technology transfer is not anticipated
to be an important problem.
Furthermore, resolution of the large uncertainties sur-
rounding cost, demand, reliability, etc., requires that
the demonstration be as close to an "authentic" commercial
scale plant as possible. Essentially, it must represent
the government's attempt to build a viable commercial
plant for the production of photovoltaic arrays. Thus,
it will be sized in the range considered optimal for
commercial production and it must demonstrate reliable
operation for a significant period if it is to accomplish
its purpose. Hence, quite significant quantities of
arrays will be manufactured by this plant. To reiterate,
it is the purpose of the plant which distinguishes a
demonstration from a commercial plant. Even though they
may be physically identical, a demonstration plant is
built primarily to produce information, whereas a commer-
cial plant is built to produce arrays.
Pilot plar..s are also distinguished from demonstrations
according to function--a pilot reduces technological
uncertainties whereas a demonstration reduces other types of
uncertainty. Put differently, a demonstration is not simply
• large pilot plant. An oversized pilot p l ant  will fail as
• demonstration and will function inefficiently as a pilot
plant. Finally, pilot and demonstration plants should be
built sequentially--the results of the pilot are necessary
inputs to the design of a successful demonstration.
(7)	 A demonstration ,rust be able to demonstrate reliable
operation. Since pilot plants will be frequently shut down,
Y 
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they cannot perform this function. Demonstrations
undertaken before the technology is well in hand have a high
probability of failure.
(S)	 If the 500 MW peak/year production goal is viewed as an
aid to supply-side acceptance of new technology, it is
redundant--supply-side acceptance or "technology transfer"
is not anticipated to be a significant problem. If the
goal is viewed as a means by which one can attain the price
reduction goal (50C/peak watt) through the learning curve,
then it is a cost-reduction tool and Should be treated as
one. That is, output targets should he established con-
currently with other project actions intended to lower
product costs.
LSSA is also addressing two additional output quantities,
Sometimes referred to as the "X" and "Y" quantities. The
most cfficienr size production plr ► nt appears to be 20-50
MW/year. Thus, production process demonstrations need to
be sized in ► his range (the "X" quantity). Furthermore,
.1P1. currently is responsible for Sup p lying arrays to all
final product demonstrations (the "1'" quantity). .1PL is
ready to insure that the combined output from private rued
governmental production I-, at least equal to the quantity
of arrays necessary to supply all final product ph^,tovol-
taiv demonstrations (the "Y" quantity).
Considerable evidence exists to support the conclusions and
recommendations given above. Huth "f this evidence comes from two pre-
vious studies: John 'riltow s book, I ntornation ► I Diffusion of Technology:
A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industry and a hand Corporation rep -t,
An: ► ]vsis of FedcrAly Fundyd N ,mt-nstration PI-OiCctS. A summary of much
of this evidence follows.
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Semicondvetor Indu3try. it is argued that the history of the
semiconductor industry can supply insight into the expected
development of the photovoltaic supply industry. The two
industries are expected to have many of the same characteristics.
Both are highl y
 research-intensive industries, both are based on
the refining and processing of semiconductor material (silicon),
and both have (or had) high and rapidly changing technological
bases. Thus, both industries deal with the same suppliers and are
expected to operate in the same husinecs environment. Further-
more, it is anticipated that the optimum si%e plant for the pro-
duction of photovoltaic arrays is fairly small compared to the
anticipated market--between 20 and 50 Pill/peak production per year--
again quite similar to the semiconductor industry. Thus, the
A
photovoltaic industry structure should be very much like that of
the semiconductor industry. (Of course, there are some differ-
ences, the most important of which is the constraint placed on
photovoltaic manufacturers by the requirement to cover a given
Jarea with silicon material. That is, the opportunities for minia-
turization of photovoltaics and the associated cost reduction
`i
	
	 potential are much smaller than in the semiconductor trade. How-
ever, this should impact cost reduction potential much more than
industry structure.)
In any case, evidence on the introduction and diffusion of semi-
conductor innovations is used to infer an expected rate of diffu-
sion of photovoltaic innovations. It is shown that the longest
time elapsed between the date of development of a new process or
product and its subsequent commercial introduction for six new
t
	
	
processes was one year (in some cases it was a matter of months).
Innovation and diffusion was shown to occur very rapidly; new
firms often took the lead in introducing new products and other
firms imitated the innovator, becoming; second Sources, comet i111L'S
within six months.
AL 4 p.G^^ 1S
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The serniconduetor industr y was shown to have a highly flexible
structlrro with new firms entering and growing to a large size
quite rapidly (e.g., Texas instruments, Transition). 	 Libel-al
patent licensing policies have prevailed, with many patents
simply being ignored altogether. The industry is highly com-
petitive and encounters little governmental interference.
Venture capital was easily available to new senliconducLor firms,
and there were no significant barriers to entry. During the
time of most rapid technological change: and product innovation
(1952-65), the semiconductor industry remained labor-intensive.
tlnl y after the technology began stabilizing did semiconductor
fines invest ill 	 automated production facilities.
All of these conditions prevail or are expected to prevail ill the
photovoltaic supply industry.
I't•troleunl Rc f inilig ; I nd Steel Ind us tri es. 	 Although there is little
existing evidence of industrial produt-t or process diffusion in
industry in general. evidence was found of innovation and diffu-
sion of new technology in the oil and steel industries. Studies
of both industries are quoted which impl y that: long lags existed
between invention and first adoption (innovation) and also bi•tween
innovation :Ind the subsequent product or process diffusion.
However, ill hoth cases it is shown that the evl(ltlice is clot
;llyIical 1 le to the I)h0tov0lt.1 iC industry .	 In the oil industry
::t udv. the definition of i event ion placed "product re •ld i ness"
long before nnu • h of the necessary development work had taken place.
heronstrurtion of the data to fit our purposes indicated that the
a('tll:lI lag between I , rodn,'t roatIiiicss all,I Introduction w;is gll't,'
Short .
'rho steel industry results do not :11)111v bec:luse thet indusIr y is
, I1.lracterized by a highly capital-intensive exist ill)" capital
trucillre whi c h is replaced quit" slowl y .	 Additions to Ill-odnCt ioll
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capacity are minor. The industry structure is oligopolistic and
i	 highly stable. There are barriers (tariffs, quotas) to foreign
competition and difficult entry problems for domestic firms.
Thus, the large lags in the steel industry are understandable but
not important fo g- conclusions about the rate of adoption of new
technology in the photovoltaic supply industry.
Previous Federal Demonstrations. Many conclusions about the
prospects for successful industrialization of new photovoltaic
technology are drawn from a Rand stud- of 22 previous federally
supported demonstrations projects. Projects were judged as to
their success in three dimensions: (1) reducing uncertainties
with respect to cost, demand, externalities, technology and
institutional problems (information success), (2) producing a
useful output (application success), and (3) stimulating subse-
quent diffusion of the product (diffusion success).
The results of the study show that a demonstration project is
more likely to be successful in these three dimensions if:
(1) Preproject technological uncertainties are low.
(2) The project had a low political profile.
(3) External time constraints were not important.
(4) The project had cost-sharing with private industry.
(5) The initiative for the demonstration did not arise within
the federal government.
(6) The technology delivery system was strong, and all its
componenLs were included in the demonstration.
1
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Thus, the three projects with 100 percent federal funding were
total failures at promoting subsequent diffusion of the product.
Furthermore, those projects that originated from or were initiated
by nonfederal actors enjoyed a significantly higher rate of
success in all three dimensions. Those projects which excited a
high Level of non-federal participation, either through cost-
sharing or project initiation, proved to have a higher probability
Of sdLcess.
Further, the four projects judged to have been conducted under
significant time constraints were judged to have been complete
failures in both the information and diffusion dimensions (one
of these was the Morgantown rapid transit demonstration).
Finally, in no demonstration where preproject technological
uncertainty was high was there success at either reducing uncer-
tainty to low levels or stimulating subsequent diffusion of the
technology.
Besides Morgantown, some of the federal demonstrations analyzed
in this study included water desalinization plants at Freeport,
Texas and at Point Loma, California, a F ish protein concentrate
plant in Washington state, and the Nuclear Ship Savannah.
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